ISW: PUTIN’S LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION IN UKRAINE:

(ISW) The Institute for the Study of War has knocked out what they feel Putin’s options are if he decides to send Russian troops into the Ukraine. Below is the condensed version, for the one it has been culled from click here:

Executive Summary:

Russian President Vladimir Putin is using the crisis he created by mobilizing a large military force around Ukraine to achieve two major objectives: first, advancing and possibly completing his efforts to regain effective control of Ukraine itself, and second, fragmenting and neutralizing the NATO alliance. Russian military preparations can support a massive invasion of Ukraine from the north, east, and south that could give Putin physical control of Kyiv and other major Ukrainian cities, allowing him to dictate terms that would accomplish the first objective. Such an invasion, however, might undermine his efforts to achieve the second objective because it could rally the NATO alliance around the need to respond to such a dramatic act of aggression. An invasion would also entail significant risks and definite high costs. A Russian military action centered around limited military operations in southern and southeastern Ukraine coupled with a brief but widespread and intense air and missile campaign could better position Putin to achieve both aims as well as reduce the likely costs and risks to Russia.

We therefore currently forecast that:

• Russia will not conduct a full mechanized invasion to conquer all of Ukraine this winter (unchanged).
• Russian mechanized forces will overtly deploy into occupied Donbas on a large scale by mid-February (increased likelihood).
• Russia may launch an air and missile campaign throughout unoccupied Ukraine in conjunction with an overt deployment into occupied Donbas (newly identified course of action).
• Russia may conduct limited ground incursions north and west from occupied Donbas and/or north from Crimea.

Our previous forecast that Russia would deploy mechanized forces to Belarus in early 2022 (which we first made in December 2020 and last updated in December 2021) has transpired.[1]

We have identified a new course of action since our previous examination of Russian options that Putin is preparing and may pursue in conjunction with an overt move into occupied Donbas: an air and missile campaign, possibly extensive, throughout unoccupied Ukraine. We have observed indicators that he is preparing this option. We assess that such an air campaign in unoccupied Ukraine is significantly more likely than an invasion intended to seize large areas of unoccupied Ukraine, including Kyiv and other major cities. Putin could initiate the air and missile campaign and/or limited ground incursions in southeastern and southern Ukraine before Russian forces have completed deployments to and preparations along the northern Ukrainian frontier and in Belarus. We are not yet ready as of January 27, 2022, to forecast that Putin will actually order the air and missile campaign in conjunction with the move into Donbas, but policymakers must be aware of the conditions the Kremlin is setting for that contingency—separate from preparations for a major ground offensive.

A Russian air and missile campaign that targets both occupied and unoccupied Ukraine could pose an even greater short-term challenge to the US and NATO than an invasion to occupy most of Ukraine in the same way that a live hostage situation creates more tension and complexity while in progress than a completed murder. Once Russian mechanized forces have seized Ukraine’s capital and major cities, Putin’s effective leverage on the West drops substantially, as he will have exercised the near-complete extent of his ability to damage Ukraine and left little for the West to try to deter by action or prevent by appeasement.

A partial attack that retains the visible capability to go further, however, increases the pressure on the West to meet some of Putin’s demands to dissuade him from further violence. Holding back from the conquest of Kyiv and major Ukrainian cities allows Putin to continue to demand concessions from the West that transcend Ukrainian issues, such as blanket commitments not to expand NATO further. Russia’s military conquest of Ukraine would seem to make such commitments irrelevant and reduce pressure on the West to make them.

An air and missile campaign that leaves the Ukrainian state nominally independent with a beleaguered and fearful government and people, however, allows Putin to protract the crisis. He can continue his efforts to maximize the tension and friction among Ukraine, the United States, and America’s European allies (especially the Germans, given their extreme vulnerability to Russia’s energy pressure) by using the threats of continuing air attacks, the economic devastation of Ukraine and Europe, or, finally, the invasion and occupation of Ukraine.

An air and missile campaign against unoccupied Ukraine would pose less cost and risk to Russia compared with an invasion and occupation of territory, although an air and missile campaign would incur more cost and risk than simply moving forces overtly into occupied Donbas without attacking beyond the current line of contact. The United States and NATO should prioritize developing a coherent response to this course of action in addition to their other efforts to deter and set conditions to respond to Russian threats.

The objectives of such a Russian air and missile campaign could include:

• Expanding wedges in the Western alliance;
• Increasing pressure on the West to make larger concessions regarding NATO expansion in general and the disposition of NATO forces in eastern Europe;
• Forcing Ukraine to make further concessions to Russian demands regarding occupied Donbas;
• Coercing Ukraine into accepting a new version of the Minsk Accords or an entirely different agreement making even more concessions that undermine Ukrainian sovereignty;
• Forcing Ukraine to amend its constitution to rule out NATO membership;
• Disrupting the Ukrainian government;
• Creating a governance and stability crisis in Ukraine by forcing concessions that infuriate Ukrainian patriots;
• Crippling the Ukrainian economy; and
• Severely degrading the Ukrainian military to set conditions for further demands or Russian military activities if Putin is not able to secure his objectives through this more limited campaign.

An air and missile campaign would be far more likely to achieve these objectives than simply moving Russian forces overtly into occupied Donbas. It would also be more likely to achieve these aims at a cost acceptable to Putin than a mechanized drive along the northern Azov Sea coast would alone.

If the Kremlin can protract the crisis on its terms, it can raise the costs to the United States and NATO. The United States and NATO must prioritize preventing Putin from protracting the crisis by rapidly increasing the risks to his forces and the cost to the Russian economy as soon as he initiates the conflict either by moving forces overtly into occupied Donbas or by attacking unoccupied Ukraine.

The United States and NATO could best deter or disrupt such an attack by deploying and using ground- and sea-based air- and missile- defense systems and stealth fighters to shoot down Russian manned aircraft attacking targets in unoccupied Ukraine. The purpose of such Western military operations would be to impose high-enough costs on Russia to persuade Putin to avoid or terminate the operation.

Overt Russian deployments into Donbas with or without a Russian air campaign in unoccupied Ukraine should trigger the full array of US and European punitive sanctions on Russia. The United States and its allies should also define a threshold at which continued covert Russian deployments into occupied Donbas would trigger a response. But the Russian course of action considered in this essay, including the air and missile campaign, puts tremendous pressure on the US relationship with its reluctant partners, especially Germany, if it does not involve significant Russian forces invading unoccupied Ukraine. The United States and its more-committed allies must prepare now for this challenging contingency.

European responses to US attempts to rally the alliance to deter Putin thus far suggest that a more limited Russian attack is more likely to weaken and fragment NATO than the military conquest of most of Ukraine. A full Russian invasion and occupation of Ukraine including Kyiv and/or other major urban centers collapses the West’s decision-space and is the likeliest Russian course of action to trigger a strong, coherent set of Western reactions. Russian military aggression short of a full-scale invasion, even including an extensive air campaign, however, gives Putin the initiative and creates uncertainty about how Putin will ultimately resolve the crisis. Putin has used this approach to great effect in Syria and elsewhere. It opens room for much debate and disagreement about responses among the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine. Continuing Russian economic pressure on Europe, especially Germany, amidst such a crisis may seriously erode alliance cohesion.

The United States and its other NATO partners must nevertheless accept the risk of serious strain and even damage to the US-German and NATO-German relationship to respond decisively to this more-limited form of Russian aggression. Allowing Putin to coerce major concessions from Ukraine or the West through limited aggression poses a greater danger to the NATO alliance’s cohesion, credibility, and even survival than does antagonizing Germany and other recalcitrant NATO members by imposing tough economic penalties on Russia that hurt those allies economically. Repairing strains with Germany and other allies, especially those caused by bad decisions the German government has already made, is a more manageable problem in the long run.

UKRAINE : RUSSIAN SITUATION REPORT: JANUARY 25TH 2022

(ISW) The nice people at the Institute for the Study of War have brought out a map which shows the situation around the Ukraine regards Russian troop deployments as of the 25^th January 2022:

 

SYRIA SITUATION REPORT: FEBRUARY 5 - 18, 2020

(ISW) The nice people over at the Institute for the study of war have knocked out their latest situation map on Syria:

SYRIA SITUATION REPORT: December 1 - 14, 2017

(ISW) The nice people over at the Institute for the study of war have knocked out their latest situation map on Syria:

Syria Situation Report: August 23 - 30, 2017

(ISW) The nice people over at the Institute for the study of war have knocked out their latest situation map on Syria:

The Campaign for Ar-Raqqa City: June 20 – July 17, 2017

(ISW) The nice people at ISW have knocked out a little something which explains the situation inside Al-Raqqa, the de-facto capital of ISIS, which is currently going through its 1945 Berlin moment.

The U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) achieved small but significant gains against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City between June 20 and July 17. The SDF completed its full encirclement of Ar-Raqqa City on June 29 after seizing a number of villages on the southern bank of the Euphrates River. Operation Inherent Resolve Commander Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend stressed that the manoeuvre emplaced a “physical band” that would “prevent escape or reinforcement” by ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City. The SDF later breached the heavily-fortified Old City of Ar-Raqqa on July 3 after coalition airstrikes destroyed two twenty-five meter sections of the historic Rafiqah (Old City) Walls. These breaches enabled partner forces on the ground to avoid pre-positioned ISIS defences at existing channels through the wall, including prepared direct and indirect fire zones, land mines, IEDs, and SVBIEDs. The SDF simultaneously continued to secure incremental gains along both the eastern and western axes of Ar-Raqqa City.

The battle for Ar-Raqqa City nonetheless stands to protract over the next several months. The SDF has reportedly encountered intensified resistance and “better-emplaced defences” over the past four weeks following initial rapid gains in districts on the outskirts of Ar-Raqqa City. ISIS has extensively leveraged innovative tools to slow coalition advances, including drone-borne munitions and a new type of motion-activated IED. The SDF has struggled for over a month to penetrate one “significant defensive IED belt” on the northern outskirts of Ar-Raqqa City. The SDF must also contend with continued pressure to protect and evacuate the estimated 30,000 to 50,000 civilians that remain trapped in Ar-Raqqa City. These challenges have been exacerbated by the poor combat performance of elements of the Syrian Arab Coalition of the SDF. Most clearing operations are reportedly led by the Syrian Kurdish YPG while allied Sunni Arabs – often suffering from lower standards of training, equipment, and motivation – serve as the rear holding force. ISIS has exploited these seams to mount successful local counteroffensives against several districts originally cleared by the Syrian Kurdish YPG. These failures highlight future problems likely to be faced by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition in the establishment of a reliable local holding force such as the Raqqa Internal Security Forces.

Syria Situation Report: June 1 - 8, 2017

(ISW) The U.S. and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) launched operations to seize full control of Ar-Raqqa City from ISIS. The SDF formally announced the start of clearing operations along three axes and later entered an outlying district of Ar-Raqqa City. Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) Commander Lt. Gen. Steve Townsend predicted a “long and difficult fight” for the city but stressed that the offensive would “deliver a decisive blow” to ISIS in Iraq and Syria. ISIS has fortified Ar-Raqqa City to a level similar to Mosul in Northern Iraq with the likely intent to inflict heavy casualties upon the SDF. ISIS has also reportedly redeployed a large portion of its leadership and external attack capabilities to Deir ez-Zour Province in Eastern Syria, limiting the strategic impact of operations against Ar-Raqqa City.

The U.S. demonstrated its continued intent to defend its operations in Southern Syria. The U.S. conducted a second airstrike targeting a pro-regime convoy advancing against opposition groups backed by the U.S. and Jordan at Al-Tanaf on the Syrian-Iraqi Border. The incident follows a similar strike against a pro-regime convoy near Al-Tanaf on 18 MAY. The U.S. stressed that the Anti-ISIS Coalition does “not seek to fight” pro-regime forces but reiterated its willingness to “defend itself” if pro-regime forces fail to depart a “well-established deconfliction zone” in Southern Syria. Russia, Iran, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad will likely continue to challenge the Anti-ISIS Coalition along the Iraqi-Syrian Border to preempt any long-term expansion by the U.S. in Eastern Syria.

IRAQ SITUATION REPORT: MAY 6 - 20, 2017

(ISW) The nice people at the Institute for the Study of War have brought out a map which shows the situation inside Iraq as of Saturday the 20th May, 2017:

Iranian backed Shia militias set conditions to disrupt or deny U.S.-backed forces freedom of maneuver near the Iraq-Syria border. Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU) forces began clearing territory in western Ninewa Province toward the Syrian border. Iran-backed PMU forces also conducted offensives against ISIS in northern Diyala and Salah al-Din provinces, and defended positions north of the Makhoul Mountains and southwest of Tuz Khurmatu from ISIS ground assaults.

ISIS remains operational in eastern Iraq, particularly in Diyala Province, despite clearing operations led by the Badr Organization since late 2014. ISIS also launched attacks in and around Baghdad in the week prior to its annual Ramadan campaign, anticipated to begin on May 26.

SYRIA SITUATION REPORT: MAY 10 - 18, 2017

(ISW) The nice people at the Institute for the Study of War have brought out a couple of map which show the situation inside Syria as of Thursday the 18th, May 2017:

Russia, Iran, and Syria redeployed forces to constrain the activities of the U.S. in Eastern Syria. Pro-regime forces reportedly deployed hundreds of fighters along the Damascus - Baghdad Highway in Central Syria at the urging of Russia following several weeks of advances in the area by opposition groups backed by the U.S. and Jordan. The U.S. later conducted an airstrike against a pro-regime convoy advancing against opposition groups at Al-Tanaf on the Syrian-Iraqi Border on May 18. Pro-regime forces also seized the Jirah Airbase in Eastern Aleppo Province from ISIS on May 12. These movements suggest that pro-regime forces intend to insert themselves into the campaigns against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City and Deir ez-Zour Province - thereby pre-empting long-term expansion by the U.S. in Eastern Syria. ISW has previously recommended that the U.S. refocus the campaign against ISIS towards Deir ez-Zour Province as a long-term base for operations against both ISIS and the Russo-Iranian Coalition in Syria.

The U.S. and Turkey likely failed to overcome their strategic divide during a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Erdogan on May 16. Trump reiterated his support for Turkey in the “fight against terror groups” including as ISIS and the PKK but did not address his recent decision to directly arm the Syrian Kurdish YPG. Erdogan condemned the decision as an “absolutely unacceptable” measure that presented a “clear and present danger” to Turkey. Erdogan also reiterated his calls for the U.S. to extradite exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen. The White House likely offered greater cooperation with Erdogan against the PKK in Turkey and Northern Iraq to mitigate the risk of an imminent rift with Turkey. These efforts nonetheless remain insufficient to reverse the growing strategic divergence between the U.S. and Turkey.

SYRIA SITUATION REPORT: APRIL 20 - MAY 10, 2017

(ISW) The nice people at the Institute for the Study of War have brought out a couple of map which show the situation inside Syria as of Wednesday the 10th, May 2017:

Russia, Iran, and Turkey agreed at a new set of Astana Talks on May 3 - 4 to establish four large “de-escalation” zones over opposition-held regions of Western Syria. The deal allows for the three countries to deploy forces along the borders of the “de-escalation zones” to monitor a faltering nationwide ceasefire that excludes all opposition forces “associated” with Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria. Activists reported a general decrease in violence except along key frontlines such as Damascus and Northern Hama Province after the deal went into effect on May 6. Russia likely intends to leverage to “de-escalation zones” to subordinate the political process to its objectives, reset its military deployments, and block future unilateral action to implement so-called “zones of stabilization” by the U.S. in Syria. Pro-regime forces will likely also use the relative lull in Western Syria to refocus their military campaign towards Eastern Syria to pre-empt the U.S. from establishing a long-term foothold in regions formerly held by ISIS in Syria. Conditions on the ground remain unfit for a durable ceasefire or political settlement to end the Syrian Civil War.

The U.S. signalled its intent to move forward with an imminent offensive to seize Ar-Raqqa City from ISIS that includes the Syrian Kurdish YPG despite clear objections from Turkey. U.S. President Donald Trump signed an order on May 8 authorizing the U.S. Department of Defence to directly provide weapons, ammunition, and other equipment to the YPG “as necessary” in support of upcoming operations against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City. Pentagon Spokesperson Dana White stated that the weapons deliveries will be “limited, mission specific, and metered out incrementally” in order to prevent the transfer of weapons to the PKK in Turkey. The U.S. also floated plans to expand an intelligence fusion centre based in Ankara targeting the PKK in Turkey. These efforts remain insufficient to address the security concerns of Turkey. The decision will likely fuel a further breakdown in relations between Turkey and the U.S. that could include new cross-border operations by Turkey against the YPG in Northern Syria. This strategic break will form a core area of disagreement during a face-to-face meeting between Trump and Turkish President Recep Erdogan in Washington D.C. on May 16.

ISIS Sanctuary: May 10, 2017

(ISW) The nice people at the institute for the study of War have brought out a map which shows exactly how much land Islamic State (ISIS) has control of in both Iraq and Syria. 

 

THE CAMPAIGN FOR MOSUL: MARCH 2-APRIL 28

(ISW) Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) units resumed their advance into western Mosul on April 11 after a 19-day pause. CTS units are advancing along two axes. The northern advance will link up with the 9th Iraqi Army (IA) Armoured Division conducting clearing operations northwest of the city. Additional CTS units are encircling the Old City toward the sector’s northern boundary. CTS Commander Abdul Ghani al-Assadi indicated his troops may open a corridor north of the Old City in hopes that ISIS militants will flee the Old City rather than fight in the dense complex. The U.N estimates as many as 400,000 civilians are trapped within the Old City. ISIS has intentionally drawn U.S.-led Coalition airstrikes on structures within the Old City where it has forced civilians to congregate. ISIS will continue this strategy, as it successfully stirred up political blowback. ISIS also conducted small-scale chemical weapons attacks on ISF in the Old City, though with minimal impact according to ISF and U.S. Department of Defense sources. ISIS will likely allocate its greatest defenses to al-Nuri Mosque, where ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared publically in 2014.

Turkey’s escalation of attacks on U.S. partner forces in northern Syria and northwest Iraq threaten anti-ISIS operations. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated he would launch a new, Iraq phase of operation in Syria, Operation Euphrates Shield on April 4. The Turkish Air Force conducted airstrikes on positions held by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) affiliates near Sinjar in addition to Hasaka Province, eastern Syria on April 25. The Turkish airstrikes also hit a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) base near Sinjar, likely unintentionally. Turkey also pressured Iraq’s Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi to redirect Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) from Tel Afar, a primarily Turkmen town west of Mosul by threatening action should the PMU seize Tel Afar. PM Abadi cut a deal with PMU elements to divert efforts from Tel Afar to villages southwest of Sinjar, near the Iraq-Syria border. PM Abadi’s decision reduced the threat of a Turkish-Iranian contest over Tel Afar that could have threatened the final phase of the Mosul operation. Turkish incursions in northern Iraq strain relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government and also detract from the Mosul campaign’s final phase.

Iraq Situation Report: March 20-April 20, 2017

(ISW) The nice people at the Institute for the Study of War have brought out a map which shows the situation inside Iraq as of Thursday the 20th April, 2017:

SYRIA SITUATION REPORT: MARCH 30 - APRIL 14, 2017

 (ISW) The nice people at the Institute for the Study of War have brought out a map which shows the situation inside Syria as of friday the 14th, April 2017:

U.S. President Donald Trump demonstrated a new willingness to use force against the regime after conducting cruise missile strike targeting the Shayrat Airbase in Central Syria on April 6. The strikes came in response to the regime’s use of sarin gas against the opposition-held town of Khan Sheikhoun in Northern Syria on April 4 that marked one of its deadliest chemical weapons attacks since the 2013 Sarin Attacks in Damascus. The U.S. attempted to leverage its limited strikes against the regime to force Russia to reveal the extent of its commitment to Iran and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

The Kremlin rejected calls to distance itself from Assad after U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 13. Russia also vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution outlining an investigation into the regime’s culpability for chemical weapons attacks. The White House nonetheless also messaged continuity in its military stance towards the Syrian Civil War. Tillerson noted in an interview on April 11 that the “first priority” remains the defeat of ISIS in Syria and warned against “violent regime change” similar to Libya. U.S. Secretary of Defence James Mattis also stated that the “military policy in Syria has not changed” and stressed that the “rest of the campaign stays on track…exactly as it was before” the chemical weapons attack.

Afghanistan: Partial Threat Assessment: November 23, 2016 - March 15, 2017

(ISW) The U.S. faces pressure from Russia as well as militant groups that seek to undermine the U.S. and NATO missions in Afghanistan during spring and summer 2017. The ANSF faces readiness gaps that will expose multiple provincial capitals to recurrent attacks by the Taliban and escalating attacks in Kabul by multiple groups, including ISIS. These threats will compound the difficulty the ANSF already faces in holding territory recaptured from Taliban forces in 2016. Russia meanwhile will attempt to thwart the U.S. and NATO by brokering peace talks with the Taliban that increasingly incorporate competing international power centres, such as China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The Taliban set conditions during the winter phase of its yearlong campaign, Operation Omari, to target provincial capitals during its upcoming spring 2017 offensive. Taliban militants attacked security posts and district centres near the provincial capitals of Helmand, Kunduz, and Uruzgan provinces over the reporting period, indicating their intent to attack these cities during their upcoming spring 2017 offensive when they announce it in April 2017. Taliban militants had also launched simultaneous attacks on the same three cities, as well as the provincial capital of Farah Province, in October 2016. Taliban militants attacked four district centers in Helmand in January and February 2017 to weaken security forces and gain territory to stage attacks against Lashkar Gah city. Taliban militants also launched several attacks against security posts on the outskirts of Tarin Kot city, the provincial capital of Uruzgan province in January and February. Taliban militants also attacked ANA bases in Baghlan-e Jadid District in Baghlan Province in March 2017 in an attempt to gain control of the ground line of communication (GLOC) that the ANSF uses to send reinforcements to Kunduz City from Kabul. These attacks indicate that the Taliban intends to launch ground campaigns against Lashkar Gah, Tarin Kot, and Kunduz cities during the upcoming spring offensive.

ISIS Wilayat Khorasan took advantage of ungoverned and remote spaces in northwest Afghanistan to expand its territory. ISIS expanded beyond its stronghold in Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan and established a base to receive and train foreign fighters in northwest Afghanistan. Uzbek militants fighting with ISIS in Jowzjan province exerted social control by destroying Sufi shrines, burning civilian homes, and erecting prisons in early 2017. ISIS deployed recruiters from Zabul province to set up a training camp in Nimroz province in early 2017. ISIS will prioritize expanding its control in Afghanistan as it faces the loss of its capital cities in Syria and Iraq in 2017. ISIS will also attack Afghan state institutions directly. ISIS launched a complex attack against the ANSF national military hospital in Kabul on March 8, 2017. The attack demonstrated an increase in capability, insider access, and the transfer of techniques from other groups in the area or from ISIS’s core terrain.

ANSF force regeneration is not on track to match the Taliban’s spring offensives. The ANSF failed to secure large swaths of territory from Taliban militants during the winter phase of its own counter-offensive campaign, Operation Shafaq. The majority of its holding forces are insufficiently trained and under-equipped, requiring additional support from Afghan Special Security Forces. Taliban militants targeted southern and northern districts during the winter phase of Operation Omari while the ANSF conducted anti-ISIS operations in the East. The ANSF continues to struggle with high casualties and attrition despite ongoing U.S.-led force regeneration efforts. Recruitment generally keeps pace with these losses, but it is insufficient to build the force necessary to clear and hold territory from Taliban militants. The Afghan Air Force’s (AAF) capabilities are steadily increasing, but its airframes are in “dire condition” due to high operational tempo and compromised helicopter maintenance due to sanctions on Russian equipment. Russia will attempt to leverage this weakness to insert itself in Afghanistan’s security sector on its own terms. The Taliban will likely capitalize on the ANSF’s readiness gaps by launching simultaneous offensives in separate regions during its spring offensive in order to stretch and weaken the ANSF to a breaking point.

RUSSIAN AND IRANIAN BASING IN SYRIA: MARCH 21, 2017

(ISW) Pro-regime basing data accurate through March 21, 2017. Syria Control of Terrain data accurate through April 3, 2017.

SYRIA SITUATION REPORT: MARCH 17 - 30, 2017

(ISW) The nice people at the Institute for the Study of War have brought out a map which shows the situation inside Syria as of Thursday the 30th, March 2017:

Al-Qaeda resumed large-scale offensive operations against the regime following a consolidation phase in Northern Syria. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham - the successor of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Fatah al-Sham - and Ahrar al-Sham launched a major operation against pro-regime forces in Northern Hama Province on March 21. ISW has previously assessed that Al-Qaeda would launch operations against Hama City in order to destabilize the regime and achieve symbolic resonance among Salafi-Jihadists due to the 1982 Hama Massacre. Current conditions remain unpromising for the Geneva Talks on the Syrian Civil War that resumed on March 23. The likely failure of these negotiations will provide additional impetus to Al-Qaeda’s narrative that opposition groups should abandon the negotiating table.

Turkey is posturing to gain American support to consolidate its safe zone in northern Syria. Turkey announced the "successful" end of Operations Euphrates Shield in northern Aleppo Province. The announcement comes ahead of a visit by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson who emphasized the need for the U.S. and its allies to form "interim zones of stability" in Syria during the Anti-ISIS Summit on 22 - 23 MAR. The consolidation of the Turkish safe zone in northern Aleppo risks further empowering Salafi Jihadi groups such as Ahrar al Sham in northern Syria.

The U.S. accelerated its campaign to isolate and seize Ar-Raqqa City alongside the Syrian Kurdish YPG. The YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) launched an operation to seize the Tabqa Dam west of Ar-Raqqa City on March 22 with extensive support from the U.S. including airstrikes, artillery fire, attack helicopters, and embedded advisors. The U.S. also transferred at least 500 SDF fighters to the southern bank of the Euphrates River via helicopter to cut the Aleppo - Ar-Raqqa Highway. The operation - which will likely provoke a negative response from Turkey - began on the same day as a two-day ministerial conference of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Washington D.C.

ISIS lost Deir Hafr, Syria to pro-regime forces, bringing the regime closer to ISIS-held Raqqa and U.S. forces attempting to isolate the city. Deir Hafr previously functioned as an ISIS headquarters and command and control center, although ISIS likely relocated these capabilities prior to the regime advance. Separately, ISIS attacked a checkpoint in southern Baghdad using a tanker SVBIED, inflicting heavy casualties and demonstrating its resilient attack capabilities.

THE CAMPAIGN FOR MOSUL: MARCH 17-29, 2017

(ISW) The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) slowed its offensive in central Mosul on March 26 out of concern for the estimated 400,000 civilians remaining in the Old City. ISF continues operations in the outer neighbourhoods, but has largely paused the offensive into the Old City. Local sources claimed that a Coalition airstrike on March 17 killed as many as 200 civilians in the adjacent New Mosul neighbourhood. The Coalition confirmed that it conducted a strike in the area on March 17, however the strike may have set off ISIS VBIEDs or rigged houses near the strike, which caused the bulk of casualties. U.S. officials insisted that the Trump Administration has not loosened the rules of engagement for airstrikes. The Obama Administration in December 2016 had allowed Coalition advisors on the ground to directly call in airstrikes in order to improve precision. International human rights groups have criticized the Coalition for not making sufficient effort to prevent civilian casualties, however. A UN official stated that at least 307 civilians have died in western Mosul so far, the majority in the March 17 airstrike. ISIS is deliberately complicating the Coalition’s ability to conduct airstrikes by using the civilian population as human shields.

ISF is opening a second front to isolate the Old City, rather than working through it, in order to maintain pressure on ISIS and avoid civilian casualties. Units are advancing along the Old City’s western edge towards the Great Mosque, which they will likely seek to retake before turning inward. The ISF could also increase pressure on ISIS by positioning the 9th IA Division, which completed the recapture of Badush Sub-District on March 26, to breach Mosul from the northwest.

U.S. officials announced on March 27th the deployment of 240 additional troops from the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, likely in order to accelerate the defeat of ISIS in Mosul. The troops are most likely already in place. This deployment is not a response to the March 17 airstrike, as the force is tasked with force protection and IED clearance, but it could still further enable airstrike precision. Iraqi political backlash against the March 17 airstrike could slow or constrain Coalition efforts, however. Sunni political leader Osama al-Nujaifi called for an “immediate end” to airstrikes in Mosul on March 24. A reduction in Coalition airpower in Mosul would increase the risk to ISF and U.S. forces by making them more vulnerable to ISIS tactics such as SVBIEDs.

Meanwhile, Iranian proxies in the Ministry of Interior and the Badr Organization have increased Iran’s influence in the Mosul operation.

The ISF’s official media outlet listed the 2nd Badr Brigade’s operations together with the 9th IA Division northeast of Mosul city on March 22, suggesting a growing interoperability between the Popular Mobilization and the Iraqi Army. Coalition advisors are currently supporting the 9th IA Division. The Popular Mobilization entered Mosul’s city limits as part of a humanitarian campaign which it launched on March 14. Aid convoys entered recaptured western neighbourhoods soon after, bearing the flags of the Badr Organization and Liwa Ali al-Akbar, a Hawza affiliated militia. Unidentified armed forces, likely Badr, accompanied the convoys.

The Ministry of Interior, an Iranian client, appointed Abu Dargham al-Maturi as commander of the 6th Federal Police Division, a new unit that made its operational debut at the start of the western Mosul operation on February 19. Abu Dargham is also the commander of a Badr Organization’s brigade and has used his dual role to permit entry to proxy militias into off-limit operations. His appointment to the division underscores the risk of further Iranian infiltration into the ISF and inside Mosul.

The Badr Organization will continue to expand Iranian influence in Mosul after its recapture. It is already working to establish a political presence in northern Iraq. It may also try to co-opt local tribal militias, currently acting as hold forces, as it did in Salah al-Din by financially supporting a tribal militia as part of the Popular Mobilization in early 2016. The Badr-controlled Ministry of Interior will likewise ensure that the Mosul Police Chief remains friendly to the central government and amenable to Iranian interests. The U.S. must ensure that the post-ISIS holding force in Mosul City is both controlled by the Iraqi government and responsive to its authority. The U.S. must contain and reduce Iran’s influence in Mosul. The Badr Organization’s direct presence in Mosul city and its environs places American service members at risk. Its continued presence in Mosul could also could drive sectarian tensions that ISIS or other insurgent groups could use to recruit, undermining the success of anti-ISIS operations.

Syria Situation Report: March 9 - 17, 2017

(ISW) The nice people at the Institute for the Study of War have brought out a map which shows the situation inside Syria as of Friday the 17th, March 2017:

Iraq Situation Report: February 17-28, 2017

(ISW) The nice people at the Institute for the Study of War have brought out a map which shows the situation inside Iraq as of Thursday the 28th, February 2017:

ISIS could be facing difficulty coordinating successful attacks in Iraq as losses in Mosul are forcing it to transform from a governing to guerrilla style terrorist organization. ISIS did not carry out the wave of complex attacks predicted to occur in response to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launching operations to retake western Mosul on February 19. The deviation from the expectation may be a result of ISIS losing coordination between cells across Iraq as it takes time to regroup or as the ISF puts pressure on lines of communication in northern Iraq. ISF may also be improving in its ability to pre-empt or thwart attacks. ISIS launched a major attack against checkpoints near the Syrian-Jordan-Iraqi border from February 22 to 24 and targeted checkpoints in Diyala Province on February 23. However, these attacks alone do not match the intensity of ISIS’s previous responses, in which ISIS either carried out major attacks in generally quiet areas, such as Kirkuk City or Sinjar, or ramped up the frequency or scale of attacks in usual attack zones, such as Baghdad. ISIS may have planned for attacks in Samarra, Karbala, and Abu Ghraib to reach the response threshold, but these attacks were thwarted by the ISF over the course of February 21 to 24. The decline in ISIS’s response is not likely a sign of permanent loss of ability to attack, but rather an indication that ISIS may take time to sufficiently regroup its command and logistical hubs as it deals with losses in Mosul and northern Iraq.