(ISW) The nice people at 'the institute for the study of
war' have knocked out a report on the Russian air-force carrying out operations
inside Syria:
Russia shifted the focus of its air campaign from
north-western to eastern Syria from January 14 – 25 in support of pro-regime
forces vying to repel a major ISIS offensive against Deir ez Zour City. Prior
to the start of that offensive, however, Russia conducted aggressive air
operations against opposition terrain in southern Idlib and western Aleppo
Provinces from January 12 – 13, continuing to flout the nationwide ‘ceasefire’
agreement that Russia brokered with Turkey and Iran on December 28. These operations
demonstrate Russia’s commitment to set conditions for pro-regime forces to
clear the suburbs of Aleppo City and thereby strengthen their hold over Syria’s
largest urban centre.
On January 14, ISIS mounted an offensive against pro-regime
forces in Deir ez Zour City, severing the pro-regime ground line of
communication linking regime-held districts in the western half of the city to
the Deir ez Zour Military Airport two days later. In response to the jihadist
group’s gains, Russia conducted heavy waves of airstrikes against ISIS in Deir
ez Zour City and its environs from January 14 – 17, intensifying its operations
even further from January 18 – 25 amidst concerted pro-regime ground efforts to
relieve the besieged airport. In support of those efforts, Russian Tu-22
strategic bombers conducted airstrikes against ISIS in Deir ez Zour Province
after taking off from Russia and transiting Iraqi and Iranian airspace on
January 21 and 23 – 25, according to the Russian Ministry of Defence.
Meanwhile, Russian warplanes also targeted ISIS sanctuaries in eastern Homs and
Hama Provinces, including the city of Palmyra. The dramatic surge in Russian
airstrikes against ISIS, however, does not suggest that Russia can be a
reliable partner for the U.S. against Salafi-jihadist groups. Rather, the surge
reflects Russia’s strategic interest in bolstering the claim of Syrian
President Bashar al Assad over all of Syria and maintaining a foothold in the
Euphrates River valley from which to launch future operations into western Iraq.
Although the ISIS offensive precipitated a shift in the focal point of the
Russian air campaign in Syria, that shift will be a temporary one. Once
militarily practicable, Russia will renew its air operations against the
acceptable opposition in north-western Syria in order to further constrain U.S.
options for engagement in the Syrian Civil War.
The ISIS offensive in Deir ez Zour City coincided with a
Russian Ministry of Defense announcement that Russia and Turkey conducted their
first “joint air operation” against ISIS in the suburbs of al Bab in northern
Aleppo Province on January 18, but Russia will not make a long-term investment
in the defeat of ISIS in northern Syria, either. Russian warplanes actually
began targeting al Bab and its environs in advance of the announcement,
conducting airstrikes against the nearby town of Tadef on January 13 and the
city itself on or around January 16 – 17. Meanwhile, the U.S.-led anti-ISIS
coalition began airstrikes in support of Turkish-backed operations against ISIS
in al Bab, conducting no fewer than four strikes near the city from January 16
– 17. The failure of Turkish and Turkish-backed forces to make significant
gains near al Bab during this period, however, suggests that Russia will not
allocate the air assets necessary to confer a decisive military advantage to
the Turkish-led Operation Euphrates Shield (OES). In striking al Bab, Russia
aims to exploit Turkey’s condemnation of the U.S. for failing to provide more
timely support to OES and thereby exacerbate the rift between the two NATO
allies, all at a minimal investment of military assets and while claiming
credit for counter-terrorism operations. Russia likely also sortied strategic
bombers against ISIS in Deir ez Zour Province and falsely claimed coordinated
airstrikes with the U.S. against ISIS in al Bab on January 22 to highlight its
ostensible value to the anti-ISIS campaign to the new U.S. administration.
Whatever the effectiveness of its anti-ISIS air operations in the short-term,
Russia’s reactionary response to ISIS in Deir ez Zour City and its
opportunistic targeting of the jihadist group in al Bab demonstrate that Russia
will prioritize its own strategic objectives over the defeat of Salafi-jihadist
threats in the long run.
