(ISW) The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) slowed its offensive in
central Mosul on March 26 out of concern for the estimated 400,000 civilians
remaining in the Old City. ISF continues operations in the outer neighbourhoods,
but has largely paused the offensive into the Old City. Local sources claimed
that a Coalition airstrike on March 17 killed as many as 200 civilians in the
adjacent New Mosul neighbourhood. The Coalition confirmed that it conducted a
strike in the area on March 17, however the strike may have set off ISIS VBIEDs
or rigged houses near the strike, which caused the bulk of casualties. U.S. officials
insisted that the Trump Administration has not loosened the rules of engagement
for airstrikes. The Obama Administration in December 2016 had allowed Coalition
advisors on the ground to directly call in airstrikes in order to improve
precision. International human rights groups have criticized the Coalition for
not making sufficient effort to prevent civilian casualties, however. A UN
official stated that at least 307 civilians have died in western Mosul so far,
the majority in the March 17 airstrike. ISIS is deliberately complicating the
Coalition’s ability to conduct airstrikes by using the civilian population as
human shields.
ISF is opening a second front to isolate the Old City,
rather than working through it, in order to maintain pressure on ISIS and avoid
civilian casualties. Units are advancing along the Old City’s western edge
towards the Great Mosque, which they will likely seek to retake before turning
inward. The ISF could also increase pressure on ISIS by positioning the 9th IA
Division, which completed the recapture of Badush Sub-District on March 26, to
breach Mosul from the northwest.
U.S. officials announced on March 27th the deployment of 240
additional troops from the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, likely in order
to accelerate the defeat of ISIS in Mosul. The troops are most likely already in
place. This deployment is not a response to the March 17 airstrike, as the
force is tasked with force protection and IED clearance, but it could still
further enable airstrike precision. Iraqi political backlash against the March
17 airstrike could slow or constrain Coalition efforts, however. Sunni
political leader Osama al-Nujaifi called for an “immediate end” to airstrikes
in Mosul on March 24. A reduction in Coalition airpower in Mosul would increase
the risk to ISF and U.S. forces by making them more vulnerable to ISIS tactics
such as SVBIEDs.
Meanwhile, Iranian proxies in the Ministry of Interior and
the Badr Organization have increased Iran’s influence in the Mosul operation.
The ISF’s official media outlet listed the 2nd Badr
Brigade’s operations together with the 9th IA Division northeast of Mosul city
on March 22, suggesting a growing interoperability between the Popular
Mobilization and the Iraqi Army. Coalition advisors are currently supporting
the 9th IA Division. The Popular Mobilization entered Mosul’s city limits as
part of a humanitarian campaign which it launched on March 14. Aid convoys
entered recaptured western neighbourhoods soon after, bearing the flags of the
Badr Organization and Liwa Ali al-Akbar, a Hawza affiliated militia.
Unidentified armed forces, likely Badr, accompanied the convoys.
The Ministry of Interior, an Iranian client, appointed Abu
Dargham al-Maturi as commander of the 6th Federal Police Division, a new unit
that made its operational debut at the start of the western Mosul operation on
February 19. Abu Dargham is also the commander of a Badr Organization’s brigade
and has used his dual role to permit entry to proxy militias into off-limit
operations. His appointment to the division underscores the risk of further
Iranian infiltration into the ISF and inside Mosul.
The Badr Organization will continue to expand Iranian
influence in Mosul after its recapture. It is already working to establish a
political presence in northern Iraq. It may also try to co-opt local tribal
militias, currently acting as hold forces, as it did in Salah al-Din by
financially supporting a tribal militia as part of the Popular Mobilization in
early 2016. The Badr-controlled Ministry of Interior will likewise ensure that
the Mosul Police Chief remains friendly to the central government and amenable
to Iranian interests. The U.S. must ensure that the post-ISIS holding force in
Mosul City is both controlled by the Iraqi government and responsive to its
authority. The U.S. must contain and reduce Iran’s influence in Mosul. The Badr
Organization’s direct presence in Mosul city and its environs places American
service members at risk. Its continued presence in Mosul could also could drive
sectarian tensions that ISIS or other insurgent groups could use to recruit,
undermining the success of anti-ISIS operations.
